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Abstract 
When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires 
that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted 
by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to 
analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission 
permits are allocated free of charge to carbon intensive and trade exposed industries. We show that 
this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit 
allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate 
compensation.   
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1 Introduction
Government intervention in the marketplace is often justified as a means to in-
crease net social welfare. When imposing welfare-improving regulation, a benevo-
lent government may be able to tax part of the welfare gains and use the revenue to
compensate industry for the cost of compliance. But when should compensation be
offered, to whom, and how much? Should firms that pollute the environment be of-
fered compensation for the cost impact of a regulation that forces them to internalize
the environmental damage? Should financial institutions be offered compensation
for a tax levied on financial transactions?
The distributional effects of regulation have far-reaching consequences for pol-
icy design. If no compensation is offered, industry has incentives to spend large
amounts on raising political support against the policy, and to lobby for exemp-
tion clauses that weaken the policy’s effectiveness. Worse, when the policy is not
harmonized across jurisdictions, firms may find it profitable to relocate to an un-
regulated one. As the head of a leading financial transactions company recently
told the BBC: “If [the financial transaction tax] really happened, we would have to
move our business to New York or Singapore or Hong Kong. Our business would
continue. [It is] just sad it wouldn’t continue in London.”1 The threat of reloca-
tion – if credible – is a powerful argument to extract concessions from politicians
of all stripes, as regulation-induced job losses are likely to cloud their re-election
prospects.
In the realm of climate policy, the threat of relocation is aggravated by “car-
bon leakage”, i.e. the phenomenon that industrial relocation shifts greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions to places beyond the regulator’s reach. Since GHG emissions are
a global public bad, relocation not only costs jobs at home but also weakens the
environmental effectiveness of the policy. It is therefore not surprising that gener-
ous compensations are pervasive in this area.2 For example, numerous European
1BBC interview with Michael Spencer, Group Chief Executive Officer of ICAP, available online
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16990025.
2The evidence on whether the threat of relocation is credible is very scant when it comes to cli-
mate policy. Martin, de Preux, and Wagner (2011) find no evidence that the UK Climate Change
Levy caused output reductions or plant exit among treated firms. The literature on foreign direct
investment and more broadly-defined environmental regulation suggests that, in some industries, lo-
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countries have implemented carbon taxes since the 1990’s, and virtually all of them
grant rebates or exemptions to energy-intensive firms, even though this practice runs
counter to the polluter-pays principle underlying environmental policy-making in
the EU.
This paper puts forth the simple but so far little appreciated economic logic that
compensation should be offered first to those firms where it leads to the highest
marginal improvement of the government’s objective function associated with the
policy. This is different from compensating the firms with the highest propensity to
relocate. Rather, an efficient compensation rule equalizes across firms the marginal
propensity to relocate, weighted by how damaging their relocation is to the govern-
ment’s objectives.
We analyze the implications of this idea in the context of industry compensation
rules established under the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),
the largest cap-and-trade system worldwide. The EU ETS imposes an overall cap
on CO2 emissions from stationary sources – mostly power stations and industrial
plants – in 31 countries.3 Emitters with heterogeneous abatement costs can trade
permits amongst each other or with third parties so as to lower their total abatement
cost and hence, the total cost of complying with the cap on CO2. Since the be-
ginning of the EU ETS in 2005, industrial emitters have been compensated for the
cost of compliance by receiving fairly generous allocations of free permits based
on their past CO2 emissions. Contrary to its initial plan of phasing in auctioning of
permits from 2013, the European Commission (EC) has decided in 2009 that free
permit allocation will be continued for industries deemed at a heightened risk of
carbon leakage. Determining which industries are at risk is complicated by asym-
metric information about compliance costs. Regulated firms face an incentive to
cation choice is indeed deterred by environmental regulatory stringency (e.g. Wagner and Timmins,
2009; Hanna, 2010).
3Participation in the EU ETS is mandatory for firms with installations that specialize in an
energy-intensive activity and whose capacity exceeds specific thresholds. As established by the
EU Emissions Trading Directive 2003/87/EC, the principal regulated industries in phases I and II
of the EU ETS have been fossil-fuel fired power plants and other large combustion installations, oil
refineries, coke ovens, ferrous metals, minerals, and pulp and paper. The interested reader is referred
to the book by Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis (2010) for a comprehensive review and in-depth
economic analysis of this policy.
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exaggerate these costs in order to extract more rents in the form of free permits, or
to lobby for a more lenient overall cap. The EC decided to exempt from permit auc-
tions industries that are either very carbon intensive or very trade exposed, or that
exceed certain threshold values on both measures. There is, however, no empirical
evidence that these exemption criteria are in any way related to actual relocation or
downsizing risk, let alone the marginal impacts of compensation on such risk.
This paper provides the first evidence on this topic based on new firm-level data
we gathered in telephone interviews with managers of 761 manufacturing firms
in six European countries. We applied a new survey tool developed recently by
Bloom and van Reenen (2007) with the objective to mitigate known types of bias
arising in conventional survey formats. The method allows us to elicit information
on politically contentious issues such as firms’ propensity to downsize or relocate
in response to climate change policy. In all six countries and in most industries we
studied, firms report an average downsizing risk well below a 10% cut in produc-
tion or employment. In none of the industries did we find that the average firm will
close down entirely and relocate to a non-European country. There is, however,
substantial variation in the reported vulnerability between sectors as well as indi-
vidual firms. This indicates that the EU’s approach of exempting entire industries
from permit auctions may not be efficient.
We explore this idea by developing a normative framework for industry compen-
sation under the threat of relocation. Since free permits are revoked and cancelled
when a firm exits, we assume that the propensity to relocate is declining in the
amount of free permits a firm receives. The government allocates a fixed amount of
permits so as to minimize the sum of relocation propensities across firms, weighted
by the damage caused by relocation. This amounts to minimizing the aggregate
expected damage of relocation. When damage is expressed in terms of CO2 emis-
sions, this objective function formalizes the EC’s notion of ‘carbon leakage risk’.
An alternative specification we consider minimizes ‘job risk’, i.e. the expected
amount of jobs lost due to relocation.4
4A key insight of the recent literature on the employment effects of environmental regulation
is that the number of jobs lost is necessary but not sufficient for calculating the social costs of
regulation. This is because laid-off workers may eventually find new jobs – though they suffer
earnings losses and transitional unemployment while the economy adjusts to the new regulations
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The upshot of the model is that free permits should be given to those firms where
they have the highest marginal impact on total relocation risk (i.e. carbon leakage
or job risk). Using the interview data, we show that this marginal impact varies sub-
stantially across firms and sectors, and that it is not necessarily correlated with the
impact level. Counterfactual simulations reveal that optimal allocation dramatically
reduces relocation risk, even compared to the situation where all permits are handed
out for free. We also consider the dual problem of minimizing the number of per-
mits handed out for free while constraining relocation risk. We find that the amount
of relocation risk induced by the allocation rules for phase III of the EU ETS could
be achieved with just a fraction of the amount of permits that will be handed out for
free. The mismatch between optimal and actual allocations is particularly severe
when it comes to minimizing job risk. Thus, although the exemption criteria were
designed to protect the competitiveness of the most vulnerable industries, they do
too little to mitigate the expected employment impact of carbon pricing.
A practical difficulty with implementing this optimal firm-level compensation
scheme is that firms’ vulnerability to carbon pricing is not publicly observable. We
therefore derive optimal permit allocations under the ‘feasibility constraint’ that the
allocation rule is a function of easily observable firm characteristics. We find that
even simple rules, based on firm-level employment and carbon emissions alone,
substantially reduce both carbon leakage risk and job risk.
Our analysis of the efficiency of free permit allocation in the EU ETS con-
tributes important evidence pertaining to a difficult and contentious policy issue.
Overcompensating carbon-intensive industries in times of broad public spending
cuts might nourish a political backlash against emissions trading. The evidence
presented in this paper will inform the EC’s revision of the exemption criteria, en-
visioned for 2014, but its relevance transcends the European policy context. The EU
ETS — and in particular its approach to preventing industrial relocation and carbon
leakage— serves as a prototype for new and emerging regional trading schemes
(Walker, 2013). In his review of this literature, Bartik (2013) concludes that the social cost of such
employment impacts are very uncertain because they should also account for possible multiplier
effects, the price of leisure, and firm profits, among other things. He estimates the social costs of
jobs lost due to various environmental regulations in the U.S. at between 8 and 32 percent of the
associated earnings.
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worldwide. Specifically, Australia, California, Korea, New Zealand, and Switzer-
land have already adopted the EU’s exemption criteria with minimal changes. There-
fore, it is important to analyze how accurately these criteria identify the firms and
sectors most vulnerable to carbon leakage.
Our model captures the basic trade-off between the costs of compensation and
the expected damage of relocation, while allowing great flexibility in the way these
objects are specified. Therefore, our main result that compensation should be tied to
marginal rather than total relocation propensities applies to a broad array of settings
where the regulator faces a credible threat of relocation on the part of the regulated
firms. In devising efficient compensation schemes, our approach enhances politi-
cal legitimacy of industry compensation, which is much needed when such com-
pensation clashes with general norms of policy-making such as the polluter-pays
principle.
The next section describes the process of free permit allocation in the EU ETS
and summarizes the related literature. Section 3 describes the data set, particularly
how we measure firm-level vulnerability to carbon pricing. Section 4 presents a
normative framework for optimal permit allocation under relocation risk and con-
ducts several counterfactual experiments under alternative constraints. Section 5
concludes.
2 Permit allocation in the EU ETS
Designing a cap-and-trade scheme inevitably requires a choice to be made about the
initial allocation of permits. Unless all permits are auctioned off, the regulator has
to determine the micro-allocation of permits across firms, across sectors, and – in
an international emissions trading scheme such as the EU ETS – across countries.
Initial permit allocation in phases I and II of the EU ETS followed a decentralized
process. Countries were called upon to draw up National Allocation Plans that
both fixed the national cap and determined the sectoral allocation. The majority of
countries chose to “grandfather” existing business sites, i.e. they allocated emission
permits for free based on historical emissions and adjusted for growth projections
and the national contribution towards the EU’s joint emission target under the Kyoto
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Protocol.5 Free allowances were granted to new entrants whereas the allowances of
exiting facilities were revoked and cancelled.
For trading phase III, beginning in 2013, the EC envisioned a transition towards
auctioning as the basic principle of allocation, which would transfer the ownership
of emissions from incumbent polluters back to governments and, ultimately, taxpay-
ers. Directive 2009/29/EC relegates the allocation of free emission allowances from
national governments to Brussels and stipulates a harmonized allocation scheme to
reduce competitive distortions among producers of similar products across member
states. In what follows, we explain the two main features of this scheme, namely
(i) the use of benchmarks which rewards operators who have taken early action to
reduce the emission intensity of production and (ii) the continued free allocation to
sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage.
2.1 Benchmarking
The Benchmarking Decision6 stipulates that free allocation be based on product
benchmarks to the extent possible. A product benchmark is defined as the average
greenhouse gas emission performance of the 10% best performing installations in
the EU producing that product, measured in tons of CO2 equivalent per unit of
output. An installation i producing an eligible benchmarked product j in year t
receives an allocation of free permits given by
qbi jt = benchmark j ·historical activity leveli, j · reduction j,t · correctiont . (1)
The benchmark of product j is based on the average emissions intensity in 2007-
2008. The historical reference activity level is the median activity level over the
years from 2005 until 2008 (or from 2009 until 2010, if larger). The number of free
5Ellerman et al. (2007) document that the principles guiding the development of National Alloca-
tion Plans in phase I were rather consistent across countries, as most opted for free permit allocations
based on existing emissions. In phase II, governments imposed more stringent caps while retaining
the allocation scheme. Auctioning fell far short of what was allowed and benchmarking remained
an exception (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008).
6Commission Decision 2011/87/EU determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonized
free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council (2011) OJ L 130/1 (Benchmarking Decision).
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permits resulting from the first two terms in eq. (1) is scaled by two factors. First,
the reduction factor takes a value of 0.8 in 2013 and declines linearly to a factor of
0.3 in 2020. No reduction occurs in sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage, for
which the factor takes a value of 1 in all years. Second, a uniform correction factor
is applied if necessary to align the total free allocation to benchmarked installations
with the overall cap on emissions.
Where deriving a product benchmark is not feasible, allowances are allocated
according to a hierarchy of fallback approaches. If a measurable heat carrier is
used, benchmarks apply to heat consumption, otherwise they are tied to fuel con-
sumption. If none of these approaches is feasible, the relevant benchmark is given
by 0.97 times historical process emissions. Complex installations requiring various
benchmarking techniques are first divided into sub-installations for which a single
relevant benchmark can be used to determine allowance allocations.
A distinctive feature of the EU ETS is that free permit allocation is not tied
to current production levels.7 Rather, allowance allocation is based on production
capacity prior to the trading phase and annual updates occur automatically via the
linearly decreasing reduction factor. Only under exceptional circumstances do pro-
duction choices entail an adjustment to the allowance allocation. On the one hand,
if production drops by at least 50% relative to the historical activity level, a 50%
reduction is applied to the free allowance allocation. If activity falls below 90%,
free allocation will be ceased. On the other hand, in order to increase its permit
allocation, an installation must undergo a net capacity increase of 15% or more, ac-
companied by a “significant increase in activity”. New entrants receive free permit
allocations according to the relevant benchmark, and activity levels are proxied for
by multiplying the initial installed capacity by a standard capacity utilization fac-
tor. Compared to output-based updating, the capacity-based allocation rules in the
EU ETS substantially limit an operator’s ability to influence permit allocations by
changing output and hence the impact of permit allocation on short-run production
7In contrast, carbon trading schemes in Australia, California or New Zealand establish “output
based updating” where the benchmark is scaled by current output (Hood, 2010). The US case
is analyzed by Burtraw et al. (2001); Bushnell and Chen (2012); Fischer and Fox (2007); Fowlie
(2011). Monjon and Quirion (2011) analyze a hypothetical output based updating rule for the EU
ETS.
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decisions (Ellerman, 2008; Meunier et al., 2012).
2.2 Free allocation to sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage
The gradual reduction in free allowances from 80% to 30% was met with strong
opposition from carbon intensive industries, who convinced EU law makers that
full auctioning of permits would exacerbate the detrimental impact of the EU ETS
on their competitiveness. In order to mitigate such impacts, the EC will grant 100%
of benchmark allocations for free to firms in sectors that are considered at risk of
carbon leakage. The Carbon Leakage Decision8 establishes leakage risk of a sector
or subsector based on its carbon intensity (CI) and/or trade intensity (TI). CI proxies
for the cost burden imposed by full auctioning, and is measured as the sum of the
direct and indirect costs of permit auctioning, divided by the gross value added of
a sector. The direct costs are calculated as the value of direct CO2 emissions (using
a proxy price of 30C/tCO2). The indirect costs capture the exposure to electricity
price rises that are inevitable on account of full permit auctioning in the power
sector.9 The TI metric is calculated as “the ratio between the total value of exports
to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries and the total market
size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third countries)”
(EU Commission, 2009, p. 24).
Directive 2009/29/EC stipulates a combination of thresholds for CI and TI to de-
termine if a sector is at risk of carbon leakage. Sectors are considered at significant
risk of carbon leakage if their CI is greater than 5% and their TI is greater than 10%,
or either CI or TI is greater than 30%. We subdivide eligible sectors accordingly
into three mutually exclusive categories: A – high carbon intensity (CI>30%), B
– high trade intensity and low to moderate carbon intensity (CI≤30% ∩ TI>30%),
and C – moderate carbon and trade intensities (5%<CI≤30% ∩ 10%<TI≤30%).
Figure 1 plots the location of 3-digit sectors in a diagram with CI on the vertical
8Commission Decision 2010/2/EU determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed
to a significant risk of carbon leakage (2010) OJ L 1/10 (Carbon Leakage Decision).
9They are calculated as electricity consumption (in MWh) multiplied by the average emission
intensity of electricity generation in the EU27 countries (0.465 tCO2/MWh), and applying the same
proxy price for an European Union Allowance of 30C/tCO2.
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Figure 1: Sectors exempt from permit auctions
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Notes: The figure shows a scatter plot of the carbon and trade intensities of 4-digit (NACE 1.1) manufacturing industries,
based on 9,061 EU ETS installations. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of firms in a given industry. Sectors
in areas A, B, and C will continue to be exempt from permit auctions in EU ETS phase III.
and TI on the horizontal axis.10 It is evident that category B contains most of the
sectors the EC considers at risk of carbon leakage, and that most of these sectors
are not carbon intensive at all (i.e. CI<5%). We thus split category B according to
its carbon intensity and plot in Figure 2 the relative size of the resulting five cat-
egories in terms of the shares in the number of firms, in employment and in CO2
emissions.11 By all these measures, category B turns out to be the largest group of
exempted firms. The share of CO2 emissions that is not exempt from auctioning is
as small as 15%.12. This means that the Carbon Leakage Decision leaves most pol-
lution rights with European industry and hence strongly undermines the principle
of full auctioning established in the amended ETS directive.13
10In a critical appraisal of the Carbon Leakage Decision, Clò (2010) presents a similar visualiza-
tion but does not show the size of sectors for lack of a match to firm-level data.
11Figure E.2 in the Appendix compares the size of these groups across different samples, namely
(a) all EU ETS firms in the CITL/ORBIS matched sample, (b) all such firms in the six countries
where we interviewed firms, and (c) all EU ETS firms we interviewed. This confirms that our
interview sample is representative of the underlying population.
12There are a number of competing ways to compute this figure; e.g. a study by Juergens et al.
(2013) finds a share of 23%
13In a companion paper, we analyze the empirical content of the carbon leakage criteria in more
detail (Martin, Muûls, de Preux, and Wagner, 2013a)
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Figure 2: Relative size of the exemption groups
Notes: The chart displays the relative size of each group of NACE industries which are defined by the exemption criteria.
Category B (very trade intensive sectors) is subdivided into low and moderate carbon intensity. The sample includes the
4,254 manufacturing firms participating in the EU ETS and matched to ORBIS. The first bar indicates a group’s share in the
total number of firms, the second bar its share in employment, and the third bar its share in CO2 emissions, based on the
number of surrendered permits recorded in the CITL. To compute CI and TI figures at the NACE 4-digit level, we follow the
methodology and databases used by the EU Commission (2009).
2.3 Related literature
How do these metrics relate to the profit impact of the EU ETS? On the one hand,
previously grandfathered firms will be forced to pay the market price for the right
to pollute. The CI measure is based on the assumption that the cost burden is
proportional to the ratio of direct and indirect emissions to gross value added.
On the other hand, the demand response conditions a firm’s ability to pass on
this cost burden to its consumers in the form of higher prices. Doing so will be
more difficult for a firm whose customers can easily substitute to relatively cheaper
products from competitors located outside the EU. Import penetration is a widely
used proxy for cost pass-through. However, the TI metric also contains the export
ratio whose relation to the demand response is ambiguous. While the firm might
be competing with non-EU firms for customers in its exports destinations, a higher
export intensity also reflects the factor specificity of production which tends to mit-
igate the profit impact of permit auctioning.14 In sum, there may be sectors that
look vulnerable according to EU criteria although they can easily replace carbon
intensive inputs by less carbon intensive ones, or pass-through the cost of permit
14For instance, a firm that benefits a lot from country specific factors – e.g. a skilled labor force,
natural resource deposits, or externalities from industrial agglomeration – is less likely to relocate
in response to full auctioning than a firm that can easily set up shop elsewhere. If factor specificity
creates an absolute advantage (think of Swiss watches), TI will be high because of strong exports,
not imports.
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auctioning in international product markets.
There is little empirical evidence linking the EU criteria to a sector’s vulnerabil-
ity to carbon leakage.15 In fact, the existing ex-post evaluation studies provide no
evidence of strong adverse impacts of the EU ETS on competitiveness indicators
when permits were allocated for free Anger and Oberndorfer (2008); Abrell et al.
(2011); Bushnell et al. (2013); Chan et al. (2013); Commins et al. (2011); Wagner
et al. (2013a,b). These studies use a broad set of indicators to analyze intensive-
margin adjustments to production, employment and productivity (see Martin et al.,
2013b, for a survey).
This paper extends previous research on the EU ETS by focusing on the extensive-
margin impact. The compensation scheme we propose aims at preventing carbon
leakage, following the EC’s official justification for those transfers. This differs
from the scheme used in a related literature concerned with the welfare costs of in-
dustry compensation in general equilibrium (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002; Boven-
berg et al., 2005, 2008). Not least, our paper adds to a rapidly growing litera-
ture linking firm-level data on management practices obtained in large-scale, cross-
country surveys to official performance data in order to better explain firm-level pro-
ductivity, energy efficiency and organizational structure (Bloom and van Reenen,
2007; Bloom, Genakos, Martin, and Sadun, 2010; Martin, Muûls, de Preux, and
Wagner, 2012).
3 Data
This paper combines three principal sources of data into a unique firm-level data
set suitable for analyzing the link between permit allocation and carbon leakage.
First, we collect data on vulnerability to carbon pricing – as well as on management
15While theoretical and simulation based studies find a negative impact of the EU ETS on pro-
duction in most manufacturing industries (e.g. Demailly and Quirion, 2006, 2008; Reinaud, 2005;
McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006), they also show that free permit allocation offsets negative profit im-
pacts in most industries and can even lead to overcompensation (Smale et al., 2006). These studies
do, however, highlight adverse effects of rising electricity prices on the profitability of highly ex-
posed industries such as primary aluminum production. Sato et al. (2007) review this literature and
propose to use trade intensity, carbon intensity and electricity intensity as proxies for the competi-
tiveness impact of the EU ETS.
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practices relating to climate policy more generally – by interviewing managers of
manufacturing firms in six European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Poland and the UK.16 Second, we augment this information with “hard” data
on economic performance from the ORBIS database maintained by Bureau Van
Dijk. Third, we obtain data on CO2 emissions from the official EU ETS registry,
known as the Community Independent Transactions Log (CITL). Additional EU
data sources are used to calculate carbon emissions, CI and TI at the sector level.
This section describes the data collection and matching processes and summarizes
our core data set.
3.1 Interview based measure of vulnerability to carbon leakage
To obtain a measure of the expected impact of future climate policies on outsourcing
and relocation decisions, we asked managers:17
“Do you expect that government efforts to put a price on carbon emis-
sions will force you to outsource part of the production of this business
site in the foreseeable future, or to close down completely?”
The answers to this question were translated into an ordinal ‘vulnerability score’
(VS) on a scale from 1 to 5. Analysts were instructed to assign a score of 5 if
the manager expected the plant to be closed completely, and a score of 1 if the
manager expected no detrimental impacts at all. A score of 3 was given if the
manager expected that at least 10% of production and/or employment would be
outsourced in response to future policies. Scores of 2 or 4 were given to account
for intermediate responses.
VS across all firms in the sample has a mean of 1.87 and a standard deviation
of 1.29. ETS firms expect a significantly higher impact of 2.14 than non-ETS firms
(1.49). Inspection of the raw data suggests that carbon pricing will affect German
and French and Polish firms more strongly than British, Belgian and Hungarian
16Scheduling of interviews began in late August 2009 and the last interview was given in early
November 2009.
17See Appendix G for the exact wording and sequencing of the relocation questions.
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Figure 3: Average vulnerability score by country and industry
Germany
France
Poland
UK
Belgium
Hungary
1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
mean 95% conf. int.
(a) by country
Other Minerals
Glass
Fuels
Iron & Steel
Other Business Services
Cement
Ceramics
TV Communication
Textile & Leather
Chemical & Plastic
Wood & Paper
Other Basic Metals
Fabricated Metals
Vehicles
Publishing
Food & Tobacco
Furniture & NEC
Wholesale
Machinery & Optics
Construction
1 2 3 4 5
mean 95% conf. int.
(b) by sector
Notes: The bars show the average score in a given country (a) or 3-digit sector (b). Bootstrapped confidence bands are
calculated at the 95% level. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
firms (cf. Figure 3a). However, in no country does the 95%-confidence band in-
clude outsourcing of more than 10% of production in response to regulation. Look-
ing across different industries, fuels and other minerals, glass, iron & steel are the
most vulnerable (cf. Figure 3b). In all other industries, the average VS is rather
low. In no industry do we find that plant closure and complete relocation are in the
95% confidence interval.18
Further results (reported in Appendix Table A.5) show that only French firms
expect significantly stronger-than-average impacts after controlling for industrial
composition and interview noise.19 Hence the heterogeneity in the responses is
driven mainly by sectoral differences. Again controlling for interview noise, we
find that other minerals, glass, iron & steel, and cement are the most vulnerable
industries, irrespective of employment size. Other energy intensive industries such
as food & tobacco, fabricated metals, and vehicles are significantly less vulnerable
than the average.
18Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows the full distribution of the vulnerability score, by country
and industry. Summary statistics are reported in Table A.4.
19The regressions underlying Table A.5 include interviewer fixed effects to control for possible
bias on the part of the interviewers. They also control for interview noise due to the manager’s
characteristics – by including the tenure in the company, dummies for gender and professional back-
ground (technical or law) – and due to the time of the interview – by including dummies for month,
day of week and time of day (am/pm).
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3.2 Validity of the vulnerability score
Given the importance of the VS measure for the analysis to follow, we now describe
key aspects of the interview design and the sampling procedure which help to min-
imize potential sources of bias. Additionally, we present evidence that our measure
is internally consistent with other interview results, and that it is externally consis-
tent, based on energy price elasticities of employment in a large sample of firms in
Europe and other OECD countries.
Interview design We adopt a survey tool based on structured telephone inter-
views pioneered by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) and designed to avoid sev-
eral sources of bias common in conventional surveys (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001). Unlike other survey formats, the interviewer engaged the interviewee in a
dialog with specific questions for discussion. On the basis of this dialog, the inter-
viewer then assessed the company along various aspects of management relevant
for climate policy, including VS. We provided exemplary responses that interview-
ers could consult when in doubt about giving a high versus a medium or low score
for the relevant dimension. The goal was to benchmark the practices of firms ac-
cording to common criteria. For instance, rather than asking the manager for a
subjective assessment of the management’s awareness of climate change issues we
gauged this by how formal and far-reaching the discussion of climate change topics
was in current management.
As in Bloom and van Reenen (2007), the interview process was “double blind”.
Interviewees were not told that their answers would be scored, so as to avoid giv-
ing them an incentive to provide biased information. Conversely, interviewers were
given no information about the firm except the contact details, so as to minimize
the chance that their preconceptions about the firm could influence the scoring pro-
cess.20 For consistency checks of interviewer scoring, a subset of randomly selected
interviews were double-scored by a second team member who listened in.
20Given our focus on medium-sized firms, the graduate students conducting the interviews were
unlikely to have prior knowledge about the firm they were interviewing (Bloom and van Reenen,
2010).
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Random sampling Our sampling frame comprised all manufacturing firms with
more than 50 but less than 5,000 employees contained in ORBIS for the countries
under study. Out of a total of 44,605 such firms, possible interview partners were
drawn at random and contacted via phone until an interview was given or explicitly
denied. We oversampled EU ETS firms by drawing firms at random from the EU
ETS registry so that between 50% and 70% of managers contacted in each country
worked at an EU ETS firm. In total, we contacted 1,451 firms in the six coun-
tries and interviewed 761 of them (131 firms in Belgium, 140 in France, 138 in
Germany, 69 in Hungary, 78 in Poland, and 209 in the UK). Of all firms we inter-
viewed, 446 (57%) were in the EU ETS. In spite of a relatively high response rate
of 53% (68% among EU ETS firms and 39% among the rest), sample selection bias
might arise if interviewed firms differ in systematic ways from firms that declined
to be interviewed. We compare the principal firm characteristics available in the
ORBIS database – turnover, employment and capital – between firms interviewed
and not interviewed, conditional on a firm’s participation in the EU ETS. These
comparisons are reported in Section A.2 of the Appendix and show no statistically
significant evidence of sample selection on observable characteristics.
Internal consistency Table 1 shows that VS correlates in expected ways with
other interview responses that also capture vulnerability to carbon pricing in some
way but may be deemed less subjective. A low VS is strongly associated with a high
cost pass-through as well as with a low share of non-EU competitors. Both circum-
stances enable firms to pass the cost of carbon pricing on to their customers and thus
help to protect them against the detrimental effects of carbon pricing. Moreover, we
find a strong positive association between VS and a number of management prac-
tices relevant for climate change, such as the setting, monitoring and enforcement
of targets for energy consumption or GHG emissions, as well as process innovation
in areas related to climate change. This is plausible as the firms most adversely
affected by carbon pricing have stronger incentives to monitor and reduce their car-
bon intensity and permit liability. When the sample is restricted to include only
EU ETS firms, similar qualitative findings emerge although the statistical signifi-
cance on some of the management variables is lower. In sum, these results support
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Table 1: Correlations between vulnerability score and other interview variables
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Notes: Coefficients of correlation between the vulnerability score and other interview variables. Variables refer to numbers
unless indicated otherwise; D denotes a dummy variable and S another interview score constructed in a way similar to the
vulnerability score. CC stands for “climate change”. Results in column 1 are based on the full sample wheras those in
column 2 are calculated using only firms in the EU ETS. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5%(**)
and 1%(***) level.
the internal consistency of VS as a measure of the firm’s vulnerability to carbon
pricing.
External consistency If VS is a valid measure of a firm’s propensity to outsource
jobs in response to higher carbon prices, one would expect that high VS firms re-
spond to higher energy prices in a similar fashion, especially if energy prices in
alternative locations abroad remain low.21 To test this hypothesis, we examine
whether energy price elasticities of employment are negatively correlated with our
VS measure across sectors. To this end, we regress manufacturing employment on
the difference between energy prices at home and abroad, using more than 460,000
21Following common practice in empirical economics, we use the energy price as a proxy where
carbon price data are not available for lack of relevant policies (e.g. Popp, 2002).
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firm-year observations from ORBIS.22 The energy price differential is calculated at
the sector level by subtracting the inverse-distance weighted mean of energy prices
abroad from the domestic energy price. To control for differences in labor costs
we also include the wage differential, calculated in the same fashion. Factor price
differentials vary at the industry, country and year levels. We interact these price
variables with different transformations of the VS variable to test for heterogeneous
employment responses to changing energy prices. Our regression model allows for
firm fixed effects, a full set of country-year effects, and sectoral trends. This con-
trols for unobserved heterogeneity across firms, for transitory shocks at the macro
level, and for differences in employment trends across sectors, respectively. We
implement this regression using the dynamic panel estimator by Blundell and Bond
(1998), which controls for endogenous prices and serially correlated error terms.
Section B.1 in the Appendix describes the data and methods used in detail.
Table 2 reports the elasticity estimates based on data for the years 2001 through
2007, separately for a sample of 20 OECD countries and a sample of 16 European
countries. We interact the price variables (i) with a dummy indicating whether a
firm belongs to a sector with above-median VS (High VS), or (ii) with the deviation
of the sector VS from the overall VS mean. In each case, we find strong evidence
that the employment response to an increase in the energy price differential de-
creases with the sector’s VS. For instance, column 1 reports a small positive energy
price elasticity of 0.046 for sectors with below-median VS values.23 For “High
VS” sectors this elasticity is 0.019 lower. This effect is economically significant as
it accounts for 41% of the total effect for the reference group. Similarly, column
2 reports that firms in sectors whose VS is 1 score point above the overall mean
exhibit an energy price elasticity that is 0.007 lower than the average, which is eco-
nomically significant as well.24 The results in columns 3 and 4 are very similar.
22Estimating the elasticity in this way abstracts from substitution effects that occur when both
home and foreign energy prices change by the same amount. In fact, the domestic energy price
should matter for relocation only if energy prices in alternative locations are lower.
23That is, a doubling of the energy price differential leads to a 4.6 percent increase in employment.
Note that we have no priors about the absolute sign of the elasticity. The net impact on employment
depends on the relative size of a substitution effect (positive) and an output effect (negative).
24Increasing a sector’s mean VS by two standard deviations (+1.76) reduces the employment
elasticity w.r.t. to the energy price differential by 0.012. This reduction amounts to one third of the
17
Table 2: Estimates of the energy-price elasticity of employment in vulnerable sec-
tors
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Notes: The dependent variable is firm-level employment measured on a logarithmic scale. The domestic EP index is cal-
culated as the average price across different fuel types (in logs), with constant expenditure weights. The foreign EP is the
average EP in all foreign countries, inversely weighted by the geographical distance to that country. The vulnerability score
(VS) is the sectoral employment-weighted average of the firm-level VS. High VS indicates a VS above the median. The
regressions also include a full set of country-year effects and sectoral trends. The sample comprises all ORBIS firms that
reported 10 or more employees at least once between 1999 and 2007. The OECD sample comprises 20 OECD countries
(listed in Appendix B.1). In columns 3 and 4, non-EU countries are excluded from the sample and Romania is included. All
regressions are implemented with the System GMM by Blundell and Bond (1998). Robust standard errors, clustered at the
firm level, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) levels.
In sum, these regressions show that the VS – which indicates a higher chance of
downsizing domestic operations in response to higher carbon prices – is consistent
with how manufacturing firms in Europe and in the OECD adjust their labor input
in response to the energy price differential between domestic and foreign locations.
Expectations about free allocation The question underlying VS was asked within
the hypothetical policy context of firms not receiving any free permits. This is a
counterfactual scenario, not just because manufacturing firms had been receiving
free permits throughout the first two phases of the EU ETS, but also because many
of them could expect to receive free permits to cover a non-negligible share of their
emissions even in Phase III.
Respondents were not explicitly instructed to consider the no free allocation
main effect (0.038) of the energy price differential, and to more than half of the main effect of the
wage differential on log employment (-0.022, cf. Appendix Table B.2).
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scenario when the initial relocation question was posed. If respondents anchored
their answers to the expected allocation of free permits, rather than to the hypothet-
ical scenario we described to them, this would likely induce downward bias in the
VS.
Directive 2009/29/EC specifying the criteria and thresholds for free allocation
to sectors at risk of carbon leakage was published four months before we started
the interviews. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents
correctly anticipated that they would receive free permits. If this expectation had
a systematic effect on responses, then we should observe a discrete jump in VS
around the thresholds. We examine this using a regression discontinuity design that
accommodates multiple assignment variables. For a variety of specifications and
functional forms, the effect of thresholds on VS is not significant. We thus cannot
reject the hypothesis that the available information on free permit allocation did not
influence the responses to the hypothetical question underlying VS.25 A detailed
description of this analysis is relegated to Appendix B.2.
3.3 Data on economic performance and carbon emissions
Balance-sheet data on firm performance and other characteristics are obtained from
ORBIS. Table 3 summarizes selected variables for the sample of 761 firms we in-
terviewed. The sample is well stratified with respect to age, size, profitability, and
ownership. Table A.3 in the Appendix compares the sample means of each charac-
teristic between firms in the EU ETS with those that are not and reports the results
from a test of equality group means. This reveals that EU ETS firms are older,
larger and more profitable than their counterparts outside the EU ETS, and that
these differences are statistically significant.
Data on carbon emissions and permit allocations for all EU ETS firms in the
sample are calculated as the average, respectively, of verified emissions and allo-
25Given this result, it seems unlikely that firms not at risk of carbon leakage would underreport
their vulnerability due to the prospect of free allowances under the benchmarking rules. Free al-
locations to those firms will be as small as 30% of benchmark emissions in 2020. Moreover, the
Benchmark Decision was published in May 2011, i.e. 18 months after the completion of the inter-
views. This means that the political uncertainty these firms faced about how many free allowances
they would get was much larger than for the sectors covered by the Carbon Leakage Decision.
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Table 3: Firm characteristics
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Notes: EBIT: Earnings Before Interests and Taxes. Interview data sample of 761 firms. Figures correspond to the year 2007.
Source: ORBIS (Bureau Van Dijk).
cated permits between 2005 and 2008 obtained from CITL. Benchmark allocations
for phase III are taken from the National Implementation Measures (NIMs). We ag-
gregate these installation-level variables up to the firm level before matching them
to ORBIS.
EU ETS firms interviewed by us are sampled either from ORBIS or from the
CITL. They are subsequently matched to the CITL or ORBIS, by hand (in the case
of Germany, Hungary and the UK) or using lookup tables available in the public
domain (in the case of France, Belgium and Poland). This also allows us to assign
firms in the CITL to 4-digit NACE industrial sectors.26 To match firms and coun-
tries that are not included in our interviews or in official lookup tables, we draw on
a mapping from CITL to ORBIS by Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2012).27 This allows
us to match 75% of CITL installations and emissions to ORBIS firms. NACE rev
1.1 classification and employment data is available for 4,254 firms, 71% of which
are manufacturing firms. Table E.1 of the Appendix summarizes the correspon-
dence between sectoral classifications.
26NACE stands for "Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté
européene" (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community).
27We thank Rafael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre for graciously providing us with NACE
code identifiers and employment data based on their mapping. The match comprises 5,037 firms
(9,061 installations) with a total of 1,743 million tons of CO2.
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4 Optimal permit allocation
In a cap-and-trade scheme, the permit price is determined by the total cap and the
marginal cost schedules of all regulated firms. Therefore, the way in which the
total cap is allocated across firms should have no bearing on marginal production
decisions. However, permit allocation directly affects firm behavior at the extensive
margin through its impact on firm profits, because a firm that exits or relocates loses
its permit endowment.28 This section develops a simple normative model of permit
allocation where the government’s principal concern is to prevent the relocation of
production to places where carbon regulation is less stringent.
4.1 Model setup
We consider a firm i that is located in a regulated country and earns a profit of
pii(p,qi) which depends on the number of free permits qi allocated to the firm and
on the prevailing permit price p. Since free permits can be regarded as a lump-
sum subsidy to the firm we assume that
∂pii(p,qi)
∂qi
> 0 ∀ p > 0. By relocating to
an unregulated country f , firm i would obtain profit pii f and incur relocation cost
κi. The firm relocates if pii(p,qi) < pii f −κi. We assume that the government has
accurate information on the firm’s profits at home but cannot observe the net cost
of relocation εi ≡ κi − pii f . The government only knows that εi is an iid random
variable with mean µε and standard deviation σε and that it follows a continuously
differentiable distribution function Fi(·). Given the binary relocation variable
yi ≡ 1{εi <−pii(p,qi)} (2)
the government’s assessment of the probability that firm i relocates is thus given by
Pr(yi = 1|p,qi) = Fi [−pii(p,qi)] .
The revised Emissions Trading Directive 2009/29/EC grants compensation to
polluting industries both to protect their international competitiveness and to pre-
vent carbon leakage. We formalize these policy objectives by assuming that the
28Since the capacity based updating in phase III does not affect short-run production choices
(cf. Section 2.1 above), we choose to model free permit allocation to existing firms as a lump-sum
transfer. We explore the implications of output-based updating in Appendix D.
21
government minimizes the total expected damage of relocation, expressed in terms
of carbon leakage or jobs lost. For brevity, we refer to the objective as ‘relocation
risk’, or use the terms ‘carbon leakage risk’ or ‘job risk’ whenever the damage is
specified.
The contribution to aggregate relocation risk by individual firm i is given by
ri(qi) = Fi [−pii(p,qi)] · [αli (p)+(1−α)ei(p)] (3)
where li (p) and ei(p) denote the level of employment and emissions at firm i at
permit price p, respectively, and α their relative weight in the government’s damage
assessment. Thus, it is assumed that, when firm i relocates to a non-EU country,
all of its jobs are lost and all of its emissions “leak” to non-regulated countries.
In what follows, we take the total cap Q¯ to be exogenously fixed. Therefore, the
carbon price is constant and will be omitted hereafter for ease of notation.29
The government chooses how many permits qi to allocate to each firm i so as to
minimize aggregate relocation risk R = ∑ni=1 ri(qi) subject to the sum of allocated
permits not exceeding the overall cap Q¯:
min
{qi≥0}
n
∑
i=1
ri(qi) s.t. ∑
i
qi ≤ Q¯. (4)
Given the assumptions on Fi, an additional free permit always brings about a marginal
reduction in the probability of relocation. Hence the shadow price λ of a permit is
positive and the permit constraint holds with equality. The first-order condition for
an interior solution is given by
F ′i [−pii(qi)]
∂pii(qi)
∂qi
[αli +(1−α)ei] = λ ∀i. (5)
Equation (5) requires the regulator to equalize, for each firm, the reduction in ex-
pected job losses and carbon leakage brought about by the last free permit allocated
to that firm.
29The carbon price could vary as the overall distribution of abatement costs changes when some
facilities exit. Since our primary concern is with the elasticity of profits w.r.t. free permit allocation,
we leave this as a topic for future research.
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To appreciate the emphasis on the marginal relocation probability, consider two
firms with identical levels of employment and abatement at price pc but with dif-
ferent relocation probabilities. Optimality requires that the government allocate
the bulk of free permits not to the firm with the highest relocation propensity but
rather to the firm where these permits bring about the largest reduction in the re-
location probability, weighted by a convex combination of jobs and emissions at
the firm. Although this important insight follows immediately from straightforward
economic reasoning, it has not been voiced in the public debate on free permit allo-
cation so far.
Consider now the dual of program (4) which seeks to minimize the amount of
free permits allocated to the firms subject to the constraint that relocation risk does
not exceed the level R¯:
min
qi≥0
n
∑
i=1
qi s.t.
n
∑
i=1
ri(qi)≤ R¯ (6)
It is easily seen that the first-order condition for an interior solution to this program
requires that the impact on relocation risk of the last free permit be equal across
all firms receiving positive amounts of permits, as was shown above for the primal
program.
4.2 Numerical solution
In solving for the optimal permit allocation we want to allow for firm-specific re-
location probability functions Fi(·) and for corner solutions that can arise when
the marginal impact of the first permit on relocation risk at a firm falls short of its
shadow value. This suggests a numerical approach to solving programs (4) and (6)
based on standard dynamic programming techniques.30
For an arbitrary ordering of firms, the recursive formulation of program (4)
yields the Bellman equation
Vi (si) = min
0≤qi≤si
Fi [−pii(qi)] [αli +(1−α)ei]+Vi+1 (si−qi) (7)
where si is the amount of total permits left when reaching firm i and Vi+1 (si−qi)
30Appendix C provides further information on the computational details.
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is the value of leaving si − qi permits to all remaining firms in the sequence. It is
straightforward to solve eq. (7) numerically, starting with the last firm N in the se-
quence whose value function is given by VN (sN) = Fi [−piN(sN)] [αlN +(1−α)eN ].
For firms earlier in the sequence, we iterate on (7) to choose the optimal qi for each
possible si. The same approach allows us to solve the dual problem (6) after invert-
ing eq. (3) to get qi = pi
−1
i
[
−F−1i
(
ri
αli+(1−α)ei
)]
. Rather than allocating the pieces
of a fixed pie of free permits so as to reduce total risk, we now allocate the pieces
of a fixed pie of relocation risk so as to minimize total permits. The analogue to
Bellman equation (7) is given by
Wi (si) = min
0≤ri≤si
pi−1i
[
−F−1i
(
ri
αli +(1−α)ei
)]
+Wi+1 (si− ri) (8)
and can be solved recursively in the same fashion as described above.
Calculating the marginal propensity to relocate We assume that the unob-
served net cost of relocation follows a logistic distribution and consider a linear
approximation to the profit function pii(qi) = δ0i + δ1iqi.
31 This yields the reloca-
tion probability
Pr(yi = 1|qi) = Fi (−pii(qi)) =
1
1+ exp(β0i +β1iqi)
(9)
with parameters β0i ≡
δi0+µε
σε
and β1i ≡
δ1i
σε
. We calibrate these parameters for each
firm based on the interview responses. While the VS captures the managers’ as-
sessment of the future impact of carbon pricing on their businesses under the as-
sumption of no free allocation, we obtain its gradient by asking how the VS would
change if the company was granted permits for 80% of its emissions at no cost.32
For a given mapping from the VS into relocation probabilities,33 this allows us
31We allow the coefficient on free permits to vary across firms to account for the fact that the
present value of free permits allocated during phase III varies across firms. This reflects differences
in capital costs due to risk, taxation, and access to credit.
32This corresponds to questions 12a and 12c of the interview, cf. Appendix G. Figure E.1 in
Appendix E shows the distribution of the change in vulnerability conditional on the initial VS.
33We follow the interview scoring grid in assigning probabilities of 0.01, 0.10 and 0.99 to scores
1, 3 and 5, respectively. We interpolate between these numbers and assign probabilities of 0.05 and
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to evaluate the relocation probability with no free permits, Pri(yi = 1|qi = 0) as
well as with 80% free permits Pri(yi = 1|qi = 0.8ei) and use these to back out the
parameters β0i = ln
[
1−Pri(yi=1|qi=0)
Pri(yi=1|qi=0)
]
and β1i =
1
0.8ei
ln
[
1−Pri(yi=1|qi=0.8ei)
Pri(yi=1|qi=0.8ei)
−β0i
]
in
equation (9).
4.3 Simulation of counterfactual allocations
We compute optimal allocations under different assumptions about the govern-
ment’s objective function (risk vs. cost minimization), about the damage weights
(job loss vs. carbon leakage ), and about the level at which free permits are al-
located (firm or sector). Counterfactual permit allocations provide a benchmark
against which to compare de facto permit allocations in phase II (grandfathering)
and phase III (benchmarking), so as to quantify the efficiency costs of these alloca-
tions.
Minimizing relocation risk Table 4 compares the relocation risk associated with
the free permits handed out under grandfathering or benchmarking (in column 1)
with the minimal risk, subject to the constraint that the total number of free permits
matches the amount handed out in the reference scenario (in column 2). The first
row shows that job risk under grandfathering can be reduced from 4.2% to 2.9% of
employment in EU ETS sectors when permits are allocated optimally across firms.
With benchmarking, job risk increases by two thirds to 6.9% of ETS employment.
Optimal redistribution of permits to firms brings the risk back down to 2.9%. To
account for sampling error surrounding these point estimates, we report the boot-
strapped 95th percentile of each statistic in brackets. This shows that the risk to jobs
amounts to at most 4.7% of ETS employment in 95 out of 100 cases. Moreover,
while the average reduction in job risk compared to the benchmarking scenario is
almost 4 percentage points, a reduction by at least 1.9 percentage points can be
achieved with 95% probability.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the risk of carbon leakage as a share of total emissions
covered by the ETS for the same allocations. The baseline risk, which at 15.7% is
0.55 to scores 2 and 4, respectively.
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Table 4: Risk of job loss and carbon leakage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference scenario Actual Risk Minimized Risk Change in Risk
A. Percentage share of ETS employment at risk
Grandfathering 4.16 2.93 3.23 -1.23 -0.93
[4.66] [5.03] [-0.56] [-0.37]
Benchmarking 6.92 2.94 4.51 -3.98 -2.41
[4.66] [6.54] [-1.92] [-0.46]
B. Percentage share of ETS emissions at risk
Grandfathering 15.66 13.15 14.34 -2.51 -1.32
[23.88] [24.16] [-0.36] [-0.22]
Benchmarking 22.79 13.20 21.91 -9.59 -0.88
[23.89] [31.80] [-4.45] [3.18]
Optimized over - Firms Sectors Firms Sectors
Notes: Shares of jobs (panel A) or CO2 emissions (panel B) at risk of relocation are expressed relative to total employment
or emissions at all ETS firms in the sample. Column 1 reports actual risk associated with a given reference scenario (grandfa-
thering or benchmarking) whereas columns 2 and 3 report minimal risk subject to the constraint that the total number of free
permits not exceed the amount allocated under the reference scenario. Permit allocation is optimized across firms (column 2)
or across sectors (column 3). Columns 4 and 5 report the change in risk after optimization. In addition to the point estimates,
columns 2 through 5 report the 95th percentiles in brackets, obtained from a non-parametric bootstrap with resampling.
higher than the job risk, increases by almost half to 22.8% under benchmarking.
Efficient allocation reduces the leakage risk to just above 13% for either permit
constraint. When benchmarking is taken as the reference scenario, optimal permit
allocation reduces the average leakage risk by 9.6 percentage points. Accounting
for sampling error, the risk reduction is at least 4.5 percentage points with 95%
probability.
Furthermore, we calculate minimal relocation risk under the additional con-
straint that the government cannot assign free permits at the firm level but only at
the sector level. This is meant to take into account political constraints that led
the EC to establish exemption criteria at the 4-digit sector level. We assume that
a firm receives permits according to its share in the sector’s total emissions under
grandfathering and aggregate the resulting relocation risk across firms within sec-
tors. The results in columns 3 and 5 of Table 4 show that both job and leakage risks
are higher than with firm-level allocations.34 While sector-level allocation still re-
34The constraints on the number of free permits are binding now because grandfathering individ-
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duces job risk compared to benchmarking – at least 0.5 percentage points with 95%
probability, and 2.4 percentage points on average – this is not guaranteed anymore
for CO2 risk. In fact, the 95th percentile of the risk change reported in column 5 is
positive. Unlike grandfathering, benchmarking sometimes leads to lower leakage
risk than optimal sector-level allocations. These efficiency gains can be attributed
to the within-sector allocation of permits and partly justify the considerable admin-
istrative effort that went into benchmarking.
Cost minimization Minimizing the amount of free permits subject to a given re-
location risk can be regarded as the tax payer’s cost minimization program because
it minimizes the amount of foregone auction revenue for a given outcome. Table 5
displays the share of permits handed out for free under different allocation schemes.
The first row shows that optimal allocation at the firm level gives rise to drastic effi-
ciency gains. The relocation risk associated with grandfathering could be achieved
by handing out only between 14.3% and 24.5% of permits for free, depending on
whether job risk or carbon leakage risk is held fixed.35
Under benchmarking, a large number of sectors and particularly the carbon-
intensive ones will continue to be exempt from permit auctioning. As a conse-
quence, 52.3% of emissions will continue to be allocated for free. This propels
the job risk to a very high level that could be achieved by optimally allocating free
permits for a mere 1.6% of total emissions. Carbon leakage risk also increases
substantially with benchmarking. Obtaining this level of leakage risk at minimal
cost would require just under 13% of permits to be allocated for free. Given that
sampling error may affect the point estimates, one can make the more cautious
statement that, with 95% probability, the level of job risk induced by the bench-
marking rules could be achieved by allocating at most 7.0% of the permits for free.
ual firms with a high marginal impact of free permits is more costly under sector-level allocation as
all other firms in the sector must be given free permits as well. Clearly, those permits are then not
available anymore to grandfather more vulnerable firms in other sectors.
35Two mechanisms drive this result. First, the majority of firms in our sample report that their
propensity to relocate does not vary with the amount of free permits. It is optimal to assign zero free
permits to those firms. Second, among the remaining firms, free permits are allocated in such a way
as to equalize the marginal propensity to relocate, weighted by jobs or carbon emissions, as required
by the first-order condition (5).
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Table 5: Permits allocated for free (in % of total emissions)
(1) (2) (3)
Scenario Actual Minimized Allocation
Grandfathering 100.0 14.3 24.5
[31.4] [39.2]
Benchmarking 52.3 1.6 13.0
[7.0] [22.3]
Risk constraint - Jobs CO2
Notes: Column 1 reports the share of free permits in total emissions under different scenarios. Minimal permit allocations
are calculated subject to the constraint that the total relocation risk not exceed the one under the scenario considered, where
relocation risk is measured in terms of either job loss (α = 1) or CO2 emissions leakage (α = 0). The 95th percentile of the
permit share, obtained from a non-parametric bootstrap with resampling, is reported in brackets.
The corresponding figure for carbon leakage risk is 22.3%. This means that EU
governments could raise additional revenue by auctioning a much larger amount of
emissions permits instead of allocated them free, without increasing the expected
cost of carbon leakage or job loss.36
4.4 Feasible optimal permit allocation
We have shown above that allocating permits optimally will significantly reduce re-
location risk compared to the Benchmarking scheme currently in place. Since this
approach relies on information that is not publicly observable and easy to manipu-
late, a possible future survey would need an appropriate mechanism to induce firms
to report their vulnerability to carbon pricing truthfully. In this section we take an
alternative approach and use the survey information to develop simple allocation
rules which are based on easily observable characteristics of firms.
Given a total amount of free permits Q¯, an allocation share θi = f (xi;γ) maps a
vector xi =(x
1
i , . . . ,x
k
i ) of k observable characteristics for firm i into the unit interval.
Suppose that the function f (·) is known up to a parameter vector γ . Substituting
qˆi = θiQ¯ into the risk minimization program (4) yields
min
γ∈Γ
n
∑
i=1
ri
(
f (xi;γ)Q¯
)
s.t.
n
∑
i=1
f (xi;γ) = 1 ∧ f (xi;γ)≥ 0 ∀i. (10)
36In a companion paper, we consider straightforward improvements to the current compensation
scheme and quantify their implications for revenue raised in permit auctions (Martin et al., 2013a).
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As this can be seen as a constrained version of (4), we refer to its solution as the
“feasible optimal allocation”. We specify an allocation rule based on the Cobb-
Douglas function, f (xi;γ) =
∏k(x
k
i )
γk
∑
n
j=1 ∏k(x
k
j)
γk
, which generalizes e.g. grandfathering
of historic emissions ei (that is, f (ei;γ) =
e
γe
i
∑ j e
γe
j
and γe = 1) to the case of multi-
ple variables. We solve for γ using a standard maximum likelihood solver where
ri
(
f (xi;γ)Q¯
)
corresponds to the likelihood contribution of observation i.
Table 6 reports the solution vector γˆ for x-vectors of varying lengths (panel A)
along with the associated risk of job loss and carbon leakage (panel B). We hold Q¯
fixed at the total amount of permits allocated for free during phase III; i.e. Q¯=∑i q
b
i ,
where qbi is the average annual amount of free permits received by firm i under the
benchmarking rules. As above, we minimize relocation risk either in terms of jobs
or carbon emissions. We start by including only qbi in xi, as an alternative way of
assessing the efficiency of free allocation in phase III. If qbi is optimal, we should
find that γˆb = 1. If γb < 1, risk can be reduced by shifting permits from firms that
receive more permits to those that receive less, and vice versa if γb > 1. When
minimizing job risk, we obtain a point estimate of γˆb = 0.44, which is smaller
than 1 at the 5% significance level and corroborates our earlier finding that the
benchmarking allocations induce too much job risk. In fact, the feasible optimal
allocation reported in column 1 reduces job risk by 1.4 percentage points.
Next, we examine three allocation rules based on different combinations of ob-
servable characteristics. For instance, when using historic CO2 emissions and em-
ployment size of a firm, the job risk drops by 2.3 percentage points (in column
2). This reduction is significant and closes 58% of the gap to the unconstrained
minimum of 2.9% of all jobs in EU ETS firms.37 Compared to column 1, the addi-
tional risk reduction is brought about by considering not only the firm’s past CO2
emissions but also employment, albeit with a smaller weight. Adding sector charac-
teristics, such as carbon intensity and trade intensity with less developed countries,
to the allocation function results in a small additional reduction of job risk, although
the difference is not statistically significant.38 Finally, measuring firm size in terms
37Panel B reports a reduction by at least 0.7 percent of EU ETS employment in 95 out of 100
bootstrap replications.
38We use TI with less developed countries because we find it to be more correlated with the VS
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Table 6: Feasible optimal allocation rules
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Minimizing expected
Minimizing expected job loss carbon leakage
A. Parameter estimates γˆ
Benchmarking 0.44 1.13
allocation [0.23, 0.94] [0.83, 1.27]
CO2 emissions 0.63 0.58 0.63 1.02
[0.51, 0.85] [0.39, 0.78] [0.50, 0.82] [0.85, 2.66]
Employment 0.23 0.29 -0.20
[0.11, 0.40] [0.12, 0.57] [-0.98, -0.03]
Turnover 0.20
[0.11, 0.33]
Carbon intensity 0.21
[-0.03, 0.53]
Trade intensity w/ -0.05
less developed [-0.11, 0.46]
B. Minimized risk and change to Benchmarking allocation (in % of total ETS employment or emissions)
Job risk 5.54 4.61 4.51 4.58 8.21 9.14
[9.05] [7.14] [6.73] [7.29] [12.08] [15.51]
∆ -1.39 -2.31 -2.41 -2.35 1.28 2.22
[-0.09] [-0.74] [-0.88] [-0.73] [2.71] [7.09]
CO2 risk 29.66 26.73 26.05 25.43 22.12 23.22
[39.53] [37.61] [35.50] [36.14] [32.33] [31.78]
∆ 6.88 3.94 3.27 2.64 -0.67 0.44
[13.17] [8.86] [8.25] [8.00] [-0.01] [4.19]
Notes: The sample consists of all 344 EU ETS firms we interviewed and for which we could match data on the phase III
allocation, employment, turnover and CO2 emissions. Panel A reports the parameters of the optimal feasible allocation
rule for different vectors of observable variables. Panel B reports the associated risk of employment loss (in % of em-
ployment at all firms in the sample) and leakage (in % of CO2 at all firms in the sample). The change is computed as the
difference between minimal risk and the risk induced by the EU Benchmark Allocation. The optimality criterion is either
job loss (columns 1 to 4) or carbon leakage (columns 5 and 6). Carbon intensity and trade intensity with less developed
countries (TI less) are defined at the 4-digit industry level. The numbers in brackets report two-sided 95% confidence
intervals of the coefficient estimates in Panel A and the 95th percentiles of the risk statistic in Panel B, obtained from a
bootstrap with 100 replications.
of turnover rather than employment (in column 4) yields results virtually identical
to those in column 2.
Feasible optimal allocation rules for minimizing CO2 risk are reported in columns
5 and 6. Including only the EU benchmark allocation yields a parameter estimate γˆb
which is not significantly different from unity. This is in line with the earlier finding
that we cannot significantly reduce risk compared to the benchmark allocation. The
same conclusion arises in column 6 where we include firm level employment and
than the overall TI used by the Commission. See Martin et al. (2013a) for an in-depth discussion of
these correlations.
30
CO2 in the allocation function.
39
Two important lessons emerge from the feasible approach to optimal permit
allocation. First, a simple allocation rule based on easily observable firm level
variables performs at least as well as the benchmarking allocation, which is based
on an elaborate – and presumably much more costly – administrative and political
process. Second, feasible allocation rules based on both past emissions and firm
size significantly reduce job risk, but have no significant impact on CO2 risk. This
suggests that there is scope for consensus between different stakeholders concerned
with different types of relocation risk.
5 Conclusion
When governments intervene in markets to regulate negative externalities, industry
associations often demand compensation for the adverse impact of regulation on
their international competitiveness. If firms are to carry the full burden of regula-
tion, so the argument goes, they have no choice but to relocate to an unregulated
jurisdiction. From the government’s perspective, relocation is undesirable because
firms take with them jobs, taxable profits and – in the case of climate policy – the
very emissions targeted by the regulation. We have proposed an industry compen-
sation scheme aimed at minimizing the expected damage of such extensive-margin
responses to regulation. This simple economic criterion requires that compensa-
tion be distributed across firms so as to equalize the expected marginal impact of
relocation on the regulator’s objective function.
We have applied this idea in the context of the EU ETS, where industry com-
pensation is given in the form of free permit allocations, with the stated objective
to prevent relocation and carbon leakage. Our analysis has shown that the criteria
adopted by the EC to establish the risk of carbon leakage give rise to inefficient al-
locations. Optimal allocation yields drastic reductions in job risk, and so do simple
approximations to the optimal allocation based on easily observable firm character-
istics. Conversely, aggregate relocation risk induced by current compensation rules
39We do not find a significant reduction of CO2 risk when including trade and carbon intensity as
in column 3, either. These results are available on request.
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could be maintained while handing out far less permits for free and selling more of
them in permit auctions. This would generate additional auction revenue at a social
cost much lower than that of alternative ways of raising public funds.
Our numerical analysis takes the EU’s stated objective to prevent relocation and
carbon leakage at face value. The benefit of this normative approach is that it high-
lights exactly how and by how much the implemented allocation rules deviate from
a precisely-defined policy goal. This benefit extends beyond the European pol-
icy context, as similar compensation principles have been adopted by other carbon
trading schemes worldwide. It stands to reason, however, that ‘unofficial’ policy
objectives behind the free allocation scheme were more nuanced. For instance, free
allocation is often used to build political support among large polluters in the ini-
tial stages of a cap-and-trade program. Future research could address these factors
in the framework of a positive analysis of distributional aspects and the political
economy of free permit allocation. Such an analysis might also take into account
possible benefits of relocation, such as a reduction in subsidy payments or in local
pollution levels.
The compensation principle proposed here also motivates further research into
firms’ relocation propensities under different allocation rules. This research could
follow a variety of approaches, ranging from the econometric analysis of observed
exit patterns to the design of a mechanism that implements optimal compensation.
Finally, our approach can be employed to assess existing compensation schemes –
or to design more efficient ones – in other settings where regulation increases the
chance of an undesirable relocation of the regulated industry.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
A Background on the management interviews
A.1 Interview practice
Interviews were carried out by graduate and postgraduate students after they had
been trained. The interviewers were paid according to the number of interviews
conducted, encouraging them to do more interviews and discouraging any firm
background research, thus preserving the double-blind nature of the survey. In-
terviewers made “cold calls” to production facilities (not head offices), gave their
name and affiliation and then asked to be put through to the production or environ-
mental manager. In the case of EU ETS firms, interviewers requested to speak to
the person responsible for the EU ETS. At this stage, the terms “survey” and “re-
search” were avoided as both are associated with commercial market research and
some switchboard operators have instructions to reject such calls. Instead, we told
them that we were doing “a piece of work” on climate change policies and their im-
pact on competitiveness in the business sector and would like to have a conversation
with the manager best informed.
Once the manager was on the phone, the interviewer asked whether s/he would
be willing to have a conversation of about 40-45 minutes about these issues. De-
pending on the manager’s willingness and availability to do so, an interview was
scheduled. If the manager refused, s/he was asked to provide the interviewer with
another knowledgeable contact at the firm who might be willing to comment. Man-
agers who agreed to give an interview were sent an email with a letter in PDF format
to confirm the date and time of the interview and to provide background informa-
tion and assure them of confidentiality. A similar letter was sent to managers who
requested additional information before scheduling an interview.
All interviewers worked on computers with an internet connection and used
VOIP software to conduct the interviews. They accessed a central interview database
via a custom-built, secure web interface which included a scheduling tool and the
interview application which displayed the questions along with the scoring grid.
The interview screen contained hyperlinks to a manual with background informa-
tion on each question. Interviewers scored answers during the interview. For all in-
terviews, the scheduling history as well as the exact time and date, duration, identity
of interviewer, etc. were recorded. All interviews were conducted in the language
of the interviewee’s residence.
The interview format follows the design pioneered by Bloom and van Reenen
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Table A.1: Interview response rates by country
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Notes: There are more interviews than interviewed firms as we conducted several interviews with different partners in a small
number of firms.
(2007). This approach seeks to minimize cognitive bias by asking open-ended ques-
tions and by delegating the task of scoring the answers to the interviewer. In addi-
tion, a large sample size and interviewer rotation is exploited to control for possible
bias on the part of the interviewers by including interviewer fixed effects in regres-
sion analyses. For further details, see Bloom and van Reenen (2010).
A.2 Sample characteristics
Table A.1 provides an overview of the number of interviews and the response rates
broken down by country and by EU ETS participation status.1 The last column
shows the response rate i.e. the fraction of firms that were contacted and with whom
we successfully conducted an interview. These vary somewhat between different
countries. For example, it is particularly low in Germany (38%) and the UK (40%),
whereas in Belgium or Hungary, firms were more willing to participate (74% and
78%, respectively). Generally, these figures are very high compared to response
rates achieved in postal or online surveys.
It is important for the validity of our analysis to rule out possible selection bias
in our sample. EU ETS firms are different from non-ETS firms, but within these two
categories, interviewed firms are not significantly different from non-interviewed
firms in regards to the most common characteristics available in ORBIS. This is
shown in Panel A of Table A.2 where each of the principal firm characteristics avail-
able from the ORBIS database (turnover, employment and capital) is regressed on
1All analysts would first conduct interviews in the UK and only then go on to conduct interviews
in another country allowing a common reference, hence the larger number of interviews for this
country. This allows us to control for interviewer bias as discussed below and also for UK responses
to be used as a benchmark.
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Table A.2: Sample representativeness
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a dummy variable indicating that a firm is part of the EU ETS, a dummy indicating
that a firm was contacted, and a full set of sector and year dummies, with the result
that the estimated coefficients are small and statistically insignificant. For the set of
firms that either conceded or refused an interview, we ran analogous regressions to
estimate an intercept specific to firms that granted us an interview. The results in
Panel B of Table A.2 show that none of these intercepts is statistically significant.
We thus conclude that our sample is representative of the underlying population of
medium-sized manufacturing firms in the six European countries covered by our
study.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of vulnerability score by country and industry
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Notes: Bar charts show the distribution of the vulnerability score by country (left) and by 3-digit NACE sector (right). The
score ranges from 1 (no impact) to 5 (complete relocation). A score of 3 is given if at least 10% of production or employment
would be outsourced in response to future carbon pricing. The number of observations in each country and industry is given
in parenthesis. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
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Table A.3: Firm characteristics by ETS participation status
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Notes: Based on 2007 data. Stars next to a variable name indicate that the respective means for ETS and non ETS firms are
significantly different at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
B Robustness of vulnerability score
B.1 External consistency: Energy price regressions
We compile data on firm-level employment, wages and energy prices in European
and OECD countries for the years from 1999 until 2007. Table B.1 summarizes the
data.
Employment Our sample covers all firms contained in the ORBIS database which
have 10 or more employees in at least one year during the sample period. In addi-
tion to employment, this source also provides industry codes at the 3-digit NACE
level. The EU sample includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. In addition to those countries, the OECD sample
includes Canada, Mexico, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States of America,
but not Romania.
Energy prices Price data for electricity, gas, liquid and solid fuels comes from
the ‘Energy Prices and Taxes database’ maintained by the International Energy
Agency.2 To ensure comparability of prices across fuels, we adjust for net calorific
value using prices in US$ per ton of oil equivalent (TOE). For each country c and
2International Energy Agency (2009). Energy Prices and Taxes. Quarter 3. Paris, France.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of the vulnerability score
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Notes: Summary statistics of the overall vulnerability score (first row), by country (panel A) and by 3-digit NACE sector
(panel B). The score ranges from 1 (no impact) to 5 (complete relocation). A score of 3 is given if at least 10% of production
of employment would be outsourced in response to future carbon pricing. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
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Table A.5: Differences in vulnerability score by sector and country
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Notes: Reported coefficients represent the deviation of a country/sector’s intercept from the overall mean vulnerability score.
Panel A is based on a regression of the vulnerability score on country dummies with additional controls for interview noise
and 3-digit sector (column 2). Panel B is based on a regression of the vulnerability score on broadly defined sector dummies
with additional controls for interview noise and employment (column 2). The asterisks indicate statistical significance of a
t-test of equality of the country/sector’s intercept and the overall mean (* p<0.1, ** p<0.5, *** p<0.01). NEC: Not elsewhere
classified.
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics: Employment, energy prices and wages
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Notes: The sectoral energy price (EPD) is the average of the logarithmic prices of different fuel categories, weighted by
the sector’s expenditure shares for each category in the UK in 2004. The domestic wage index is the logarithmic change
in the wage against its level in 2004. Foreign EP and wage indices are the averages of all foreign EP and wage variables,
respectively, inversely weighted by the geographical distance to the foreign country. ∆ stands for the first time difference
(t-(t-1)) of a variable.
year t, we compute the energy price in sector s as
EPDcst =
(
∑
e
ωes ln(p
e
ct)
)
(B.1)
where pect is the price of fuel e ∈{electricity, gas, liquid fuel, solid fuel} and ω
e
s is
the expenditure share of fuel e in sector s. Since expenditure shares are not available
for all countries in the sample, we impute them using UK data at the 3-digit NACE
code taken from the Quarterly Fuels Inquiry data maintained by the UK Office for
National Statistics. We hold these shares fixed at their 2004 values – the latest year
for which we have this information – in order to avoid the issue of endogenous
changes in fuel expenditures.
viii
In order to account for energy price variation in the other countries, we calculate
a sectoral index of foreign energy prices as the average of the energy price indices
(EPD) in all countries j other than c, inversely weighted by their geographical dis-
tance dc j to country c:
EPFcst = ∑
j 6=c
EPDjst
(
d−1c j
∑k 6=c d
−1
ck
)
(B.2)
Finally, we define the energy price differential between home and foreign countries
as
E˜Pcst ≡ EP
D
cst −EP
F
cst (B.3)
Wages Wages at the 2-digit industry level, Wcst , are taken from the LABORSTA
database maintained by the International Labour Organization (see http://laborsta.ilo.org).
Note that wage data are reported on different scales (e.g. monthly, hourly) by the
different sectors. This is however not an issue as we take the logarithmic measure
of wages and control for sectoral trends in the regressions. We construct an index
of foreign wages for each country c and sector s in year t as
W Fcst = ∑
j 6=c
lnWjst
(
d−1c j
∑k 6=c d
−1
ck
)
(B.4)
and define the difference between local and foreign wages as
W˜cst ≡W
D
cst −W
F
cst . (B.5)
Vulnerable sectors We want to assess the ability of the VS measure to identify
firms that are at risk of relocation. Since we do not have firm-level VS for the entire
ORBIS sample, we compute the employment-weighted average VS for each (3-digit
level) sector in the interview sample. We examine the relationship between VS and
the price elasticities of employment using 3 types of interactions. Firstly, we inter-
act the price variables (energy and wages) with an above-median indicator variable
(I{V Ss > q(50)}). This group is referred to as “High VS”. Secondly, we interact
the price variables with the deviation from the mean VS (V Ss−V¯ S). Finally, we re-
estimate the first specification but interact the price variables also with indicators of
the second and fourth quartiles of the VS distribution, i.e. I{q(25)<V Ss < q(50)}
and I{q(75)<V Ss}. The coefficients on these variables tell us if price elasticities
of employment vary significantly between the quartiles on either side of the median.
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Table B.2: Dynamic Panel Regressions of (log) employment
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Notes: The dependent variable is the firm employment measured on a logarithmic scale. The vulnerability score (VS) is
the sectoral employment-weighted vulnerability score, and the quartiles are defined on the panel sample. All regressions are
implemented with the System GMM by Blundell and Bond which includes a level and a differenced equation with lagged
differences and twice-lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm
level, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
x
Estimation We estimate equations of the form
lisct = βllisct−1 +βPE˜Psct−1 +βWW˜sct−1
+∑X∈XXs
(
βXPE˜Psct−1 +βXWW˜sct−1
)
+αct +αstt +αi + εit
(B.6)
where l is the logarithmic employment, X contains different sets of variables de-
rived from the sectoral VS,3 αct is a country-by-year effect, αst captures a sector
specific trend and αi is a firm fixed effect. Following Blundell and Bond (1998), we
estimate a system of equation (B.6) in levels and first differences with differences
of the explanatory variables and lagged levels, respectively, as instruments. The
system GMM estimator is necessary in our case as its less restrictive alternative,
the Arellano-Bond estimator, is susceptible to a severe weak instrument bias given
the high auto-correlation coefficient βl that we find below. In Table B.3 we also
report OLS estimates of equation (B.6) (i.e. abstracting from firm fixed effects)
which leaves our key qualitative results on energy prices intact.
In addition to the energy price elasticities reported in Table 2 in the main text,
Table B.2 reports the coefficients on wages as well as an additional specification in
columns 3 and 6 where we interact the price coefficients with four VS quartile band
indicators. The effects of energy prices in the second and fourth quartiles are not
statistically significant, which supports the more parsimonious specification with
the High VS dummy that we report in main text.
In all specifications, employment responds negatively to an increase in relative
wages, which is in line with expectations. There is some evidence of negative inter-
actions with the VS measures, yet the pattern is less robust than the one found for
energy prices. For the EU sample, for instance, we find a non-monotone relation-
ship in column 6 where the third quartile is less responsive than the fourth quartile.
Of course there is no reason why we should expect a particular pattern for wages
in terms of VS. Finally, the OLS estimates of energy prices elasticities reported in
Table B.3 lead to comparable results, although the coefficients on the endogenous
wage variable naturally look less plausible.
3In the first specification, X = {I{q(50)<V Ss}} = High V S, in the second specifica-
tion X = {V S−mean(V S}} , and in the last specification X = {I{q(50)<V Ss < q(100)} ,
I{q(25)<V Ss < q(50)}, I{q(75)<V Ss}}.
xi
Table B.3: OLS Regressions of (log) employment
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Notes: The dependent variable is the firm employment measured on a logarithmic scale. The vulnerability score (VS) is
the sectoral employment-weighted vulnerability score, and the quartiles are defined on the panel sample. All regressions
are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
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B.2 Reliability of the vulnerability score: a regression disconti-
nuity design
This section performs an additional test of the reliability of the vulnerability score
(VS). The score is based on the interviewees’ assessment of their reaction to car-
bon pricing policies until 2020, when assuming that they would not receive any
permits for free. This is a counterfactual scenario because the manufacturing firms
we interviewed could expect to receive part of their emission permits for free under
the benchmarking rule, or receive even more permits for free if they were consid-
ered to be at risk of carbon leakage. The criteria and thresholds for determining
carbon leakage risk were set out in Directive 2009/29/EC, published four months
before we started the interviews. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that
some respondents correctly anticipated that they would receive free permits. Here
we employ a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to test whether anticipation
of free permit allocation influenced interview responses in spite of our request to
consider the case of no free permits. As discussed in the main text, the criteria
for free allocation were defined in terms of a number of thresholds for the sector’s
trade and carbon intensity. If the criteria were in fact known by the respondents
and affected their reported VS, we should observe discrete jumps in VS around the
relevant threshold values.
This test only has power if the sharp discontinuity in free permit allocation at the
thresholds translated into a sharp discontinuity in managers’ expectations. The data
requirements for computing sector averages are not trivial (Juergens et al., 2013;
EU Commission, 2009), and the first official list of sectors at risk was not published
until after the interview process was completed (cf. Decision 2010/2/EU of 24
December 2009). If managers did hold expectations about free permit allocation
but failed to predict on which side of the thresholds their sector was going to be,
then the RDD based test proposed here might fail to reject for the wrong reason.
To guard against this possibility, we also test for discrete jumps in the score
relating to the expected stringency (ES) of phase III of the EU ETS. This score,
which is based on questions 9b)-9e) of the interview script reproduced in Appendix
G, measures stringency not only in terms of the overall cap – which determines
the permit price – but also in terms of how difficult it will be for the firm to keep
emissions in check with the free permit allocation it expects to receive in the fu-
ture. Since this latter aspect of stringency varies with free permit allocation, it also
depends on the thresholds for carbon leakage sectors. Finding threshold effects for
ES would thus strengthen the power of the RDD based test performed on the VS.
To begin, consider the four thresholds depicted by the bold line in panel (a) of
Figure B.1. CI thresholds are at 30% (segment 1) and at 5% (segment 3), whilst
thresholds for TI are at 10% (segment 2) and at 30% (segment 4). Most of the
xiii
Figure B.1: Defining threshold bands
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(b) Non-overlapping bands
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firms in our sample are concentrated in segments 3 and 4. A traditional RDD can
be employed to estimate the threshold effect in a narrow band around the threshold.
For example, panel (a) ofFigure B.1 depicts 10% bands on either side of segments 3
and 4. Figure B.2 plots fitted regression lines and confidence bands on either side of
the thresholds, for either of the two segments. Panels (a) and (c) of the figure focus
on the 5% threshold for CI, and panels (b) and (d) on the 30% threshold for TI. In
panels (c) and (d) of Figure B.2, the regression lines are restricted to have the same
slope above and below the threshold. In neither case can we detect a significant
discontinuity at the threshold. The point estimates of these threshold effects are
small, positive and statistically insignificant. Had the interviewees factored their
subsequent continued free allocation into their responses, we should have observed
a negative and statistically significant effect. Interestingly, we do observe such an
effect for the ES score. Panels (b) and (d) of Figure B.3 show a clear jump in the
score value when the 30% trade intensity threshold is crossed.
To account for multiple running variables and two-dimensional thresholds, we
use an approach similar to Papay et al. (2011). First, we partition the sample along
the four segments, as shown in panel (b) of Figure B.1. Next, we estimate the
equation
V Si j =
4
∑
s=1
I{i∈Fs(B)} ·
(
β sCI ·CI j +β
s
T I ·T I j
)
+βD ·EXEMPTj +x
′
i jβx + εi j (B.7)
where s indexes the segment, Fs(B) denotes the set of firms i in sector j that fall
into the band B around a particular segment, I{·} is the indicator function and xi j
xiv
Figure B.2: Effect of exemption thresholds on VS? Graphical analysis
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Figure B.3: Effect of exemption thresholds on expected stringency? Graphical anal-
ysis
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is a vector of additional control variables.4 EXEMPTj is a dummy variable indi-
cating that sector j will receive free permits by virtue of being above the threshold.
The threshold effect is identified across all partitions, using observations within a
10% band from each threshold. We allow for different coefficients on the running
variables CI j and T I j underlying the threshold dummy D j.
Panel A of Table B.4 summarizes the results. The baseline specification, which
is linear in the running variables and lacks further controls, yields a statistically in-
significant coefficient of 0.21 (in column 1). This means that firms just above the
threshold for free permit allocation have a VS that is 0.21 points (about one tenth of
the standard deviation in this sample) higher on average than the VS for firms just
below the threshold. The specification in column 2 includes firm-level CO2 emis-
sions and employment as control variables, in addition to interview noise controls
(i.e. interviewer dummies as well as interview and interviewee characteristics). The
point estimate for the threshold effect becomes negative but remains insignificant
and small in magnitude. Choosing narrower bands (5% on either side of the thresh-
old) changes the threshold estimate very little, as reported in column 3. If anything,
the point estimate is closer to 0. Columns 4 through 6 report the results when eq.
(B.7) is estimated with 15% and 20% bands, or with a second-order polynomial in
the running variables. Neither specification gives rise to a statistically significant
threshold effect.
Panel B of Table B.4 reports results based on the same specifications, but using
ES as the dependent variable. We find a significant negative threshold effect for all
specifications, suggesting that a considerable number of firms had correct expecta-
tions about their future permit allocation situation. Since we do not find threshold
effects on VS in spite of this, we conclude that managers understood correctly that
their response to the question underlying the VS was conditional on not receiving
free permits.
C Computational appendix
C.1 Firm level allocation
We implement the dynamic programming algorithm to solve programs (4) and (6)
in a STATA ado file using MATA language. The structure of these programs is akin
to a dynamic ‘cake eating problem’ Adda and Cooper (2003), with the difference
that the ‘cake’ is not distributed over time but across firms. This approach can be
4We experiment with different specifications for the running variables (linear vs. quadratic) and
controls, as well as with different bandwidths. They all yield similar results, as shown in Table B.4.
Additional results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table B.4: Effect of exemption thresholds on VS and ES? RDD estimates
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applied to a broad class of specifications for the relocation probability and objective
functions. Importantly, it allows us to solve the dual problem (6) as well.
Primal program: Minimize risk subject to fixed permit allocation Firm i’s
contribution to aggregate relocation risk is given by
ri(qi) =
di
1+ exp(β0i +β1iqi)
(C.1)
where di is the damage caused by relocation of firm i. This is substituted into the
Bellman equation
Vi (si) = min
0≤qi≤si
ri(qi)+Vi+1 (si−qi) (C.2)
We evaluate eq. (C.1) for each firm on a grid ranging from 0 to Q¯. This matrix is
passed on to the program cake.ado which evaluates and solves (C.7).
Dual Program: Minimize free permit allocation subject to fixed risk. Since
Fi (−pii(·)) is strictly monotonic in qi we can invert eq. (C.1) to get
qi = pi
−1
i
[
−F−1i
(
ri
αli +(1−α)ei
)]
and rewrite the dual program (6) as
min
{ri≥0}
n
∑
i=1
pi−1i
[
−F−1i
(
ri
αli +(1−α)ei
)]
s. t.
(
∑
i
ri ≤ R¯
)
. (C.3)
That is, rather than allocating the pieces of a fixed pie of free permits so as to
reduce total risk, we now allocate the pieces of a fixed pie of relocation risk so as
to minimize total permits. For all firms with β1i > 0 we invert function (C.1) over
the positive range to obtain
qi(ri) =
{
1
β1i
log
(
di
ri
−1
)
− β0i
β1i
ri <
di
1+exp(β0i)
0 otherwise
(C.4)
The corresponding Bellman equation is given by
Wi (si) = min
0≤ri≤si
qi (ri)+Wi+1 (si− ri) (C.5)
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Again this function can be written as a vector on a grid and passed on to cake.ado
which computes the minimum allocation.
C.2 Sector level allocation
In the sector-level allocation scenario, it is assumed that the regulator assigns free
permits to the sector as a whole but refrains from redistributing emission permits
amongst the firms in this sector. Denote by θi j (0≤ θi j ≤ 1) firm i’s share in the total
amount of permits Q j allocated to sector j. We assume that firms receive emission
permits in proportion to their historical emissions ei, i.e. θi j =
ei
∑k∈ j ek
.
Primal program Sector j’s contribution to aggregate risk of relocation is given
by
R j(Q j) = ∑
i∈ j
di
1+ exp
(
β0i +β1iθi jQ j
) . (C.6)
These can be vectorized and passed on to the cake.ado program to solve the Bellman
equation
Vj
(
S j
)
= min
0≤Q j≤S j
R j(Q j)+Vj+1
(
S j −Q j
)
. (C.7)
The program returns the optimal quantities of free permits for each sector, and
thanks to the shares θi j these map directly into firm level allocations.
Dual Program In order to use cake and the assumption of proportional permit
allocation within sectors, one would have to invert the sector risk function (C.6).
Since there is no closed-form solution for the inverse, we do not compute the permit
minimizing sector-level allocation.
C.3 Further details on computation
Characteristics of the relocation probability The probability of exiting is a de-
clining function of free permits qi bounded between 0 and 1 (cf. Figure C.1). The
marginal impact on firm exit of an additional unit of free permits for firm i is given
by
dFi [−pii(qi)]
dqi
= β1i
−exp(β0i +β1iqi)
[1+ exp(β0i +β1iqi)]
2
(C.8)
which is strictly negative for β1i > 0. This is the case if allocating more permits
for free strictly reduces the relocation probability, i.e. Fi(0) > Fi(0.8ei). Since
xx
the marginal impact of free permits on the relocation probability is declining in
absolute value, the government should allocate free permits first to firms with the
highest absolute impact of the first free permit,
β1i exp(β0i)
[1+exp(β0i)]
2 .
Figure C.1: The shape of the exit probability function
Sample Out of 770 interviewed firms, there are 429 EU ETS firms. Of these
we dropped firms with missing information on the survey questions, on the OR-
BIS variables, and on the phase III benchmark allocation. This leaves us with 344
observations across the six countries for the simulations.
Variables Employment li and turnover are calculated as pre-sample averages of
the number of employees from ORBIS over the years from 2005 to 2008. CO2
emissions, ei, are caculated as the average of surrendered permits from CITL in
years 2007 and 2008. Carbon intensity and trade intensity are computed for each
sector as documented in Section 2.
Permit allocations in the reference scenarios are calculated as follows. The
grandfathering allocation corresponds to the average CO2 emissions, as calculated
above. The benchmarking allocation is the mean allocation from 2013 until 2020,
taken from the official NIMs for the six countries. The overall cap Q¯ is calculated
as the sum of the reference allocations across all firms in the sample.
C.4 Dynamic programming using ❝❛❦❡✳❛❞♦
The ado file cake.ado uses dynamic programming to solve a minimization program
of the type
xxi
min
xi
N
∑
i=1
fi(xi) s.t.
N
∑
i=1
xi ≤ x¯.
Before calling cake.ado we need to
1. Discretize the vector x on a finite support. For simplicitly, suppose that we
have discrete support 1,2, . . . , x¯−1, x¯.
2. Evaluate, for each firm i, the risk at each point of the support:
f =

fi(0)
fi(1)
...
fi(x¯−1)
fi(x¯)

The vector f is an input to the STATA program cake.ado. The program does the
following:
1. Set the continuation value for the last firm to vN(x) = fN(x) and iterate back-
wards. The continuation value for the penultimate firm is given by vN−1(x) =
minc fN−1(c) + vN(x− c). To do this numerically, vN−1must be evaluated
for each x and c. This is done by building a matrix with values vN−1(x,c) =
fN−1(c)+ vN(x− c) where x shifts along the rows and c along the columns.
The components of this matrix are:
VN(x) =

vN(0) B B B
vN(1) vN(0) B B
...
...
. . . B
vN(x¯) vN(x¯−1) . . . vN(0)

and
FN−1(c) =

fN−1(0) B B B
fN−1(0) fN−1(1) B B
. . .
...
. . . B
fN−1(0) fN−1(1) . . . fN−1(x¯)

where B is a large number. The vector vN−1(x) is obtained by adding the two
matrices and picking the minimum in each row. The policy function aN−1(x)
is obtained in a similar fashion, as the argminof each row of the matrix.
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Figure C.2: Function plots: damage=100, β0 = 1, β1 = .5,
(a) Risk function (b) Inverse risk function (allocation)
2. This step is repeated recursively for all firms. The result is a vector v1(x)
which gives the minimal risk for every possible initial allocation of permits,
and a policy matrix A which results from concatenating all the a vectors.
3. To obtain the optimal allocation, one can start with allocation x¯ and consult
the policy function for the first firm (in the first column of A). For example, if
a1(x¯) = k ≤ x¯ we know that the row minimum was in column k which means
that the first firm should receive k− 1 free permits. Then move on to the
second column of A and evaluate at x = x¯− k to get the allocation for firm 2,
and so on.
Figure C.2 shows the shape of the risk function (in panel a) and of the inverse
risk function (in panel b). Since negative allocations are not possible, we need to
truncate the function at the root and assign 0 permits to all risk allocations larger
than the root. Moreover, firms that do not respond to free permit allocation at all
(β1 = 0) are allocated 0 permits in a separate step prior to optimization.
D Output-based updating
In Section 4 the firm’s response to free permits is modeled in terms of the probabil-
ity of exit from the EU for different allocation levels. In line with the institutional
framework of capacity-based updating, there is no intensive margin-response on
employment or output. This section shows that a similar reduced-form response
of home (EU) employment (or output) can be obtained when allowing for output
adjustments in a more flexible framework.
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Suppose that a firm’s final output Q is produced by means of a Leontief produc-
tion function
Q = min
ν∈[ε,1]
{vν}
using a continuum of intermediate input varieties vν . Production of a variety can
be in home or foreign. Varieties are produced with labor and energy leading to CO2
emissions. Home has lower effective wages (e.g. because of higher productivity),
foreign has lower energy costs.
Varieties differ in the amount of energy required to produce them. The technol-
ogy for producing varieties is Leontief
vν = min
{
Lν ,
1
γν
Eν
}
where Eν is the amount of energy and Lν labour. Energy intensity of production is
highest for variety ν = 1 and lowest for variety ν = ε . The parameter γ scales the
overall energy intensity of a firm. The cost of producing one unit of a variety ν is
given by
cν =WL + γνWE
For simplicity we normalize the energy cost in foreign and the wage cost in
home to 0. If the wage in foreign is equal to w and the energy cost in home is equal
to τ we can find the marginal variety s by equalizing the costs in home and foreign:
τγs = w (D.1)
The optimal offshoring decision
s =

ε if wγτ < ε
w
γτ if ε ≤
w
γτ < 1
1 if wγτ ≥ 1
implies that higher energy costs at home lead to a larger number of varieties being
produced abroad. Moreover, firms whose energy intensity increases faster across
varieties (high γ) produce a larger share of intermediates abroad.
The unit and marginal costs of producing a unit of final output will be equal to
c(s) =
ˆ s
ε
τγνdν +
ˆ 1
s
wdν =
1
2
τγ
(
s2− ε2
)
+w(1− s)
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Since
∂c(s)
∂ s
= τγs−w, the heuristic derivation of the marginal variety in (D.1)
gives rise to the same interior solution as the unit cost minimization program.
Free allocation Free allocation in Phase III of the EU ETS consists of a lump
sum allocation A¯ which is based on historical output and sector specific benchmarks
for the emissions intensity of output. When a firm outsources a substantive share of
production by shifting the production of certain varieties to foreign, the allocation is
adjusted downwards. As discussed above, this practice likens free permit allocation
to a step function in output. In the main text, we considered a simplified version of
this step function which had only a single step (all or nothing). Here we consider the
opposite extreme and assume that the number of permits that the firm can retain, Ai,
is directly proportional to output if output is smaller than historical domestic output
H = s¯Q¯
A =
{
sQ
H
A¯ if sQ
H
< 1
A¯ otherwise
(D.2)
Profit maximization To complete the description of the firm’s problem we have
to make an assumption about demand. Suppose we have monopolistic competition
with linear demand
P = a−bQ
Profits are given by
Π
(
Q,s, A¯
)
= aQ−Q2b−Qc(s)+
sQ
H
A¯
and the profit maximization problem becomes
max
Q,s
Π
(
Q,s, A¯
)
The first order conditions are given by
[Q] a−2Qb− c(s)+
sA¯
H
≥ 0 ∧ (D.3)
[s]
QA¯
H
−Q(τγs−w) ≥ 0 (D.4)
For an interior solution condition (D.3) implies
xxv
Q(s) =
a− c(s)+ sA¯
H
2b
From (D.4) we can solve for the optimal relocation threshold s∗:
s∗ =

ε if 1γτ
(
w+ A¯
H
)
< ε
1
γτ
(
w+ A¯
H
)
if ε ≤ 1γτ
(
w+ A¯
H
)
< 1
1 otherwise
(D.5)
From (D.3) and (D.5) it is straightforward to calculate total output Q∗, domestic
output s∗Q∗ and domestic employment
L∗ =
{
(s∗− ε)Q∗ if (s∗− ε)Q∗ < H
H otherwise
(D.6)
where the two cases follow from the allocation rule in equation (D.2).
Figure D.1 plots employment in home as a function of freely allocated permits A¯
for different parameter values. In the baseline case, employment initially increases
with A¯. The increase is more than proportional when s < 1, as the firm responds
to free permits both by increasing the share of varieties produced at home and by
increasing final output Q. Once all varieties have been repatriated, further increases
in A¯ linearly increase home employment until the firm reaches its historical output
level.
Upon comparing the different cases shown in Figure D.1, we see that the re-
sponse to free permits is slower when the firm is more energy intensive (γ high)
because a stronger incentive is required to repatriate the more energy intensive vari-
eties. The employment response is also slower whenthe demand elasticity is lower
than in the baseline case (b high). This is because the firm has more market power
and chooses lower levels of output irrespective of the share of intermediates pro-
duced at home. 5 Finally, firms with a higher historical output (H high) continue
to increase employment at higher levels of A¯ than in the baseline case. The initial
marginal impact in this case is smaller than in the baseline case because the actual
amount of permits received, A, is inversely proportional to the (larger) reference
output.
In sum, this appendix has illustrated that the S-shaped function we have used in
the main text to approximate the response of output and employment to free per-
mit allocation provides a reasonable approximation even under the (counterfactual)
5Hence the marginal impact of repatriating a variety and in turn the marginal impact of additional
free allocations is lower.
xxvi
Figure D.1: Home employment as function of free permits
assumption that free permit allocation is directly proportional to output.
xxvii
Figure E.1: Impact of free allocation on the vulnerability score
Notes: The chart shows the conditional distribution of the reduction in the vulnerability score when firms receive free permits
for 80% of their direct carbon emissions. The conditioning variable is the vulnerability score in the absence of free permits.
For example, the fifth bar represents firms that responded that future carbon pricing would likely force them to close down or
relocate. One fifth of these firms reported that receiving free permits would have no impact on this decision whereas another
fifth reported that this would neutralize any negative impact on domestic production.
E Additional Tables and Figures
Table E.1: Sector classification
Sector NACE Sectors CITL 2008 sectors
Food & Tobacco 15, 16
Textile & Leather 17, 18, 19
Wood & Paper 20,21 9
Publishing 22
Fuels 23 2,3
Chemical & Plastic 24, 25
Glass 261 7
Ceramics 262 8
Cement 264, 265,266 6
Other Minerals 267, 268
Iron & Steel 271, 272, 273, 275 5
Other Basic Metals 274
Fabricated Metals 28
Machinery & Optics 29, 30, 31,33
TV & Communication 32
Vehicles 34,35
Furniture & NEC 36
Notes: NACE sectors codes are based on NACE 1.1. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
xxviii
Figure E.2: Relative size of exemption groups in different samples
(a) All matched EU ETS firms
(b) Matched EU ETS firms in 6 interview countries (c) Interviewed EU ETS firms only
Notes: The charts display the relative size of each category of sectors in the EU ETS defined by the exemption criteria. The
first bar indicates the category’s share of firms, the second bar its share in employment, and the third bar its share in CO2
emissions, based on figures from the CITL-ORBIS match. The sample underlying figure (a) includes all manufacturing firms
in the EU ETS which we could match to ORBIS. Figure (b) is based on all such firms located in the six countries under study.
Figure (c) is based only on EU ETS firms that we interviewed.
Figure E.3: Distribution of the vulnerability score
(a) Shares in number of firms (b) Shares in employment (c) Shares in CO2 emissions
Notes: The graphs show the distribution of the vulnerability score for interviewed firms included in the EU ETS and part of
each group of sectors defined in Section 2.2. Panel a reports the shares of firms, panel b employment shares, and panel c CO2
emission shares, based on average permits surrendered in 2007 and 2008.
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